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Contraceptive Coverage Under Student
Health Insurance Plans:
Title IX as a Remedy for Sex Discrimination
KATHLEEN A. BERGIN*
Abstract: Sex discrimination in health insurance coverage is an indus-
try norm. Private health plans that reimburse for the costs of pre-
scription drugs typically exclude coverage for prescription
contraceptives. Student health insurance plans are no exception.
This Article argues that student health benefit plans that single out
prescription contraceptives for coverage distinct from other prescrip-
tion medications discriminate on the basis of sex, and therefore, vio-
late Title IX, as amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987. The Article begins by examining the system of health care
financing in the United States, and how this system leaves middle-
income college-age women without access to contraceptive financ-
ing. It then examines the extent of contraceptive coverage under stu-
dent health insurance plans, a major source of health insurance for
middle-income college-age women, and proposes the use of Title IX
as a vehicle for challenging those plans that discriminate on the basis
of sex by limiting coverage for birth control drugs, devices, and sup-
plies. Finally, this Article concludes by advancing a comprehensive
schedule of benefits that would remedy the current inequity in pre-
scription contraceptive coverage.
Middle-income college-age women are least likely to be insured.1
* J.D., University of Baltimore, School of Law, 1997; LI.M., New York University School
of Law, 1999. Cecile M. Bergin is especially thanked for her unyielding support and
encouragement throughout the drafting process and beyond. The author also thanks Deborah
Ellis, Esquire, whose comments on earlier drafts of this article contributed much to its final form,
as well as the participants of the 1998 Women and the Law Seminar at New York University
School of Law for their commitment to women's equality through legal reform.
1. See ELISE F. JONES ET AL., PREGNANCY, CONTRACEPTION AND FAMILY PLANNING
SERVICES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: A STUDY OF THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE 85
(1989) [hereinafter PREGNANCY, CONTRACEPTION AND FAMILY PLANNING]. In 1997, 14.88% of
women in the United States were uninsured, with women between the ages of eighteen and
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One reason for the low rates of coverage is that these women tend to be
young, unmarried, and unemployed, and therefore, typically do not qual-
ify for benefits under traditional health care financing schemes.2 For
women enrolled in institutions of higher education, student health insur-
ance plans provide a cost-effective and practical alternative to conven-
tional plans. A majority of students plans, however, deny or
substantially limit reimbursement for the most commonly prescribed
birth control drugs and devices.3 Title IX, as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1987, prohibits sex-discrimination in "all of the opera-
tions" of an educational institution that receives federal funds.4 This
Article suggests that the limitation and exclusion of coverage for pre-
scription contraceptives under university sponsored student health insur-
ance plans constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title IX.
The sex bias underlying policy limitations on coverage for prescrip-
tion contraceptives is apparent. Immediately upon its debut in March of
twenty-four least likely to have health coverage. See Robert L. Bennefield, Health Insurance
Coverage: 1997, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (U.S. Census Bureau), Sept. 1, 1997, at 1; see
also Peter J. Cunningham, Next Steps in Incremental Health Insurance Expansions: Who is Most
Deserving?, ISSUE BRIEF No. 12 (Center for Studying Health System Change, Washington, D.C.)
Apr. 1998, at I [hereinafter NEXT STEP]; KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SURVEY OF WOMEN ABOUT
THEIR KNOWLEDGE, AT-rITUDES, AND PRACTICES REGARDING THEIR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 3
(1997) [hereinafter SURVEY OF WOMEN].
2. See infra text accompanying notes 73-83.
3. The birth control pill is the most common form of reversible contraception used by
women. See Linda Piccinino & William D. Mosher, Trends in Contraceptive Use in the United
States: 1982-1995, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 4, 5 (1998). In 1995, 10.4 million women relied on
birth control pills as a primary method of contraception. See id. Among women between the ages
of fifteen and forty-four the distribution of reversible contraceptive use by method is as follows:
birth control pill, 10.4 million; injectables, 1.1 million; diaphragm, .72 million; IUD, .31 million;
implant, .5 million. See id. A woman's choice of preferred contraceptive method is strongly race
and age correlative. In general, the pill is used primarily by single white women under age thirty,
who have one or more years of college education. See id. at 8, 9. In contrast, female sterilization
is most common among formerly married women over thirty with less education and income, and
Hispanic and black women generally. See id. at 8, 9. The proportion of white contraceptive users
relying on birth control pills in 1995 stood at 57% for women between the ages of twenty to
twenty-four and 6% for women between the ages of forty to forty-four. See id. The proportion of
women relying on female sterilization was 3% at ages twenty to twenty-four and 45% at ages
forty to forty-four. See id. at 7. In contrast, pill use among black women between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine dropped significantly in 1995, but those declines were partially offset by
increased reliance on injectables and implants. See id. at 6, 7. Throughout this Article, "birth
control drugs and devices" and "contraceptive services and supplies" are used inclusively in
reference to all five FDA-approved reversible methods of contraception.
4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). Title IX provides that "[N]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .. " 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). For purposes of the statute, "the term 'program or
activity' and 'program' mean all of the operations of . .. a college, university, or other
postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education .... 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2)(A),
(B) (1994).
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1998, insurers rushed to expand coverage under existing policies to
include reimbursement for the costs of the male impotency drug Viagra.s
Yet to this day, forty years after the introduction of the birth control pill,
a majority of conventional indemnity plans continue to deny similar
coverage for female contraceptives.6 Industry heads defend this pattern
by citing bottom line fears that expanded contraceptive coverage would
result in premium cost hikes that, in turn, would force potential enrollees
to forego coverage altogether.7 This contention, that contraceptive cov-
erage would be prohibitively more expensive, however, is belied in both
practice and prediction. Not only is the actual cost of full contraceptive
coverage deminimus,8 but an overwhelming majority of women and
men favor insurance coverage for birth control drugs and devices even if
premium costs were to increase by as much as five dollars per month.9
5. See IMS AMERICA, PRESS RELEASE, IMS Health Forecasts Viagra Sales to Reach $1
Billion in First Year, I (visited July 6, 1998), available in <http://ims-america.com/
communications/pr.viagraJuly6.htm> (1998). One-half of all men who take Viagra are
reimbursed, at least in part, by their insurers. See id.
6. While approximately 96% of traditional indemnity plans include coverage for prescription
drugs, only 33% cover oral contraceptives. See THE ALAN GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, UNEVEN &
UNEQUAL: INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 16 (1995) [hereinafter
UNEVEN & UNEQUAL]. The disparity between coverage for oral contraceptives and the impotency
drug Viagra is perplexing given the increased cost of providing coverage for the latter. A single
Viagra pill, which must be injested each time before intercourse, carries a price tag of ten dollars,
while a full month's supply of oral contraceptives costs approximately $30. See Judy Mann, The
Pharmaceutical Double Standard, WASH. POST, May 22, 1998, at E3. Insurers seem to be
catching on. Some have limited or significantly restricted coverage for Viagra, justifying the
restrictions as needed to deter doctors from writing prescriptions for patients who are seeking to
obtain the pill simply to increase their sexual performance rather than to remedy a sexual
dysfunction. See Daniel Wise, The Lawyer Behind The Suit for That Drug, 219 N.Y. L.J. 1
(1998). In 1998, two lawsuits were filed wherein the plaintiffs claimed that ERISA bars insurers
from limiting or restricting coverage for Viagra in any way. See Sibley-Schreiber v. Oxford
Health Plans, Inc., No. 98-CV-3671 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Roe v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., No. 98-
2223 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
7. See Sen. Olympia Snowe & Sen. Harry Reid, Contraception Must be Included by
Insurers, ROLL CALL (visited October 19, 1998), available in <http://www.rollcall.com/
OmW2AI I 0/policybr/pbstoryf.html>.
8. Under a standard cost-sharing arrangement, the actual cost to employers of expanding
group coverage to include prescription contraceptives increases by less than one percent. See
Jacqueline E. Darroch, Cost of Employer Health Plans of Covering Contraceptives, 1998 The
Alan Guttmacher Inst. I. The average cost to the insurance company of unintended pregnancy
among women using no contraceptive method is more than $3,225.00 for each woman who
becomes pregnant. See Snowe and Reid, supra note 7. This figure does not take into account the
savings which may be achieved through prevention of pregnancy. See id. Estimates of the total
annual cost of providing complete contraceptive coverage range from approximately $17 to $21
per employee. See Darroch, supra at I. Employee contributions increase by $4.28 per year or
$0.36 per month. See id.
9. Forty-five percent of respondents to a recent survey conducted by the Kaiser Family
Foundation would "strongly favor" a contraceptive insurance mandate; thirty percent would
"somewhat favor" a mandate. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 1998 National Survey on Insurance
Coverage for Contraceptives, available in <http://www2.kff.org/content/archive/1404/
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:157
Moreover, contraceptive coverage pays for itself. "[A] 15 percent
increase in the number of oral contraceptive users in a health plan would
provide enough savings in pregnancy costs alone to provide oral contra-
ceptive coverage for all users in the plan."' 0 Thus, the exclusion of con-
traceptives from health insurance plans is economically indefensible.
The federal government, for its part, seems complacent in this pat-
tern of sex-discrimination. For example, Congress has refused to enact
broad based legislation that would mandate coverage for FDA-approved
contraceptives under private insurance plans." In addition, although the
1999 Budget deal required insurers participating in the Federal Employ-
ees Health Benefits Program to offer prescription contraceptive coverage
on par with other prescription medications,I2 that advance may be short-
lived. Adversaries have already introduced legislation to repeal the law,
despite their commitment to encouraging state-run Medicaid programs
to cover costs for Viagra.' 3 Among the minority of states that have
codified minimum contraceptive coverage requirements,' 4 federal pre-
insurance.html> [hereinafter Coverage for Contraceptives]. Overall, both women (81%) and men
(68%) supported a contraceptive mandate. Seventy five percent agreed that insurers should cover
contraceptives, while only forty-nine percent favored coverage for Viagra. See id.
10. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, Nation's Ob-Gyns Assail
Gender Bias in Insurance coverage, July 6, 1998, available in <http://walden.mvp.net/-rocman/
COVERG.htm> [hereinafter ACOG]. The cost savings of contraceptive coverage and resulting
use is borne out in the public sector as well. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19.
II. In 1997, Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) and Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev) introduced the
Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC), which, if passed,
would have prohibited plans that already provide coverage for prescription drugs from excluding
or restricting coverage for the most commonly used FDA-approved contraceptives and related
services. A companion bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Nita Lowry
(D - NY) and Rep. Jim Greenwood (R-Pa). See S./H.R. Res. 2174, 105th Cong. (1997). Both
measures were soundly defeated.
12. See Ominbus Consolidated & Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, P.L.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
13. The federal government encourages state-run Medicaid programs to cover costs for
Viagra. See Pharmaceutical Product News: Pfizer Viagra Medicaid Coverage, Health News
Daily, FDC REPORTS, July 6, 1998 (reporting on letter sent by Health and Human Services
Secretary Donna Shalala to National Governor's Association indicating that "under current law,
... Viagra is covered by Medicaid when a physician renders a diagnosis that the drug is medically
necessary."). Some estimate that the fiscal impact of Viagra coverage on state Medicaid programs
could reach $ 100 million annually. See APSA and NASMD Denounce Decision to Mandate
Medicaid Coverage of Viagra, AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION, July 2, 1998, available
in <http://www.apwa.org/hotnews/viagra.htm>. As a result, several states have balked at the
Viagra directive, giving rise to the possibility of multi-million dollar suits by the federal
government to enforce compliance. See Ed Anderson, Medicaid Viagra Coverage Might Be Cut,
Lawmakers Cite Fraud and Abuse, NEW ORLEANS TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at A3; Thomas P.
Wyman, Legislative Menu Items to Be Finalized Today, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, March 8, 1999, at
Al; Avram Goldstein, Medicaid Covers Viagra in Maryland and D.C., Not in Virginia, WASH.
POST, May 9, 1998, at Al.
14. In 1998, Maryland became the first state to pass legislation requiring private insurers to
provide comprehensive coverage for contraceptives. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 19-706
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emption laws15 and conscious clause limitations 16 thwart state-wide
efforts to ensure that women and men are offered comparable health
insurance coverage.
Turning a blind eye to these discriminatory insurance practices car-
ries a high price tag. The success of publicly funded family planning
programs is testimony to the cost savings that would result from a con-
traceptive coverage mandate. By facilitating access to and financing for
prescription contraceptives, publicly funded family planning services
prevent an estimated 1.5 million unintended pregnancies' 7 and over one-
half million abortions each year. 8 In fiscal terms, federal and state gov-
(1998); MD. CODE ANN., INSURANCE § 15-826 (1998). Texas requires insurers to include
coverage for oral contraceptives if all other prescription drugs are covered. See 28 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE. § 21.404 (3) (West 1998). Virginia and Hawaii require insurers to offer employers the
option of including coverage in employee benefits plans, but stopped short of mandating coverage.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.5:1 (Michie 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 432:1-604.5, 431:1OA-
116.6 (1998). The following states' legislatures submitted bills during the 1999 legislative season
that, if enacted into law, would afford some measure of contraceptive coverage: Alaska, S.B. 82/
H.B. 29, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999); California, S.B. 41/AB 39, 1999-00 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1999); Connecticut, H.B. 5502, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1999); Florida, H.B. 101, 371,
83/S.B. 1160, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess (Fla. 1999); Georgia, H.B. 374, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
1999); Hawaii, H.B. 488/S.B. 822, 20th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1999); Idaho, S.B. 1142, 55th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 1999); Illinois, H.B. 61/S.Res. 517, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (II1. 1999);
Indiana, H.B. 1443/S.B. 415, 111th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ind. 1999); Maine, S.B. 389 119th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Me. 1999); Missouri, H.B. 87, 630, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1999); Montana, H.B. 400,
(1999) Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999); Nevada, A.B. 60/S.B. 28, 70th Leg., 1st Sess. (Nev. 1999);
New Jersey, A.B. 2333, 2267/S.B.1335, 208th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1999); New Mexico, H.B.
293, 44th L3g., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1999); New York, A.B.1844/S.B. 324, 349, 1099, 222nd Leg., 1st
Sess. (N.Y. 1999); Ohio, H.B. 42, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999); Oklahoma, S.B. 222, 47th
Leg., 1st Ses. (Okla. 1999); Oregon, S.B. 521, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999); Pennsylvania,
H.B. 11,109, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999); Rhode Island, H.B.5633/S.B. 343, 1999-00 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (R.I. 1999); South Carolina, H.B. 3149, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999); Utah, S.B.
31, 1999 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 1999); Vermont, H.B. 104, 189, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 1999);
Washington, H.B. 1590/S.B. 5512, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
15. Much of traditional state authority to regulate the content of self-insured employee
benefits plans is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). ERISA prohibits states from mandating coverage for
particular benefits or services, and from defining discrimination more broadly than it is defined
under federal law. See generally Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724
(1985).
16. Conscious clause exemptions permit individuals, health care facilities, and health plans to
decline to cover or to withhold services against which the provider has a religious, ethical, or
moral objection. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., An "EPICC" Debate, The Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act, <http://www.kft.orglarchiev/repro/briefing/insuted/
insured.html>, 1998; RACHEL BENSON GOLD, Contraceptive Coverage: Toward Ensuring Access
While Respecting Conscience, THE GuTrMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY No. 6 (The
Guttmacher Institute), Dec. 1998, at 2.
17. See Jennifer J. Frost & M. Bolzan, The Provision of Public-Sector Services by Family
Planning Agencies in 1995, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 6 (1997).
18. See Jacqueline Darroch Forrest & Renee Samara, The Impact of Publicly Funded
Contraceptive Services on Unintended Pregnancies and Implications for Medicaid Expenditures,
28 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 188 (1996).
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emments avoid over $1 billion dollars worth of annual medical expenses
associated with unplanned births and abortions. For every dollar spent
on publicly funded contraceptive services, an average of $4.40 is saved
in public costs for medical care, welfare and supplementary nutritional
programs for newborns. 9
Until the inequity in prescription contraceptive coverage receives
serious political consideration, the prospect of litigation might provoke
health insurance companies to formulate equitable benefits packages. In
a 1998 Article published by the Washington Law Review, Professor Syl-
via Law challenged the denial of contraceptive coverage as discrimina-
tory against women, and called for the application of Title VII to
employment-based benefit plans that limit coverage for birth control
drugs and devices.2" Law's proposal would ensure contraceptive cover-
age for the millions of women who depend on employer-sponsored
group health insurance plans to finance medical costs. Yet, even with
the success of Law's innovative approach, seventy-eight percent of
women still would be subject to a double-standard in insurance cover-
age. 2' Among them are middle-income college-age women who rely on
student health insurance plans that unfairly exclude coverage for pre-
scription contraceptives. This Article mirrors the structure of Law's
Article and builds on her thesis that the exclusion of contraceptives from
otherwise comprehensive health plans constitutes sex-discrimination.
This Article urges the application of Title IX to discriminatory student
health insurance plans that restrict coverage for birth control drugs and
devices.
Following this introduction, Part I describes the structure of the
American health care financing system as a primary vehicle for facilitat-
ing access to prescription contraceptives. This system of private and
public health care financing channels services to older, wealthier women
on the one hand, and younger, lower-income women on the other. Strict
income guidelines and qualification criteria, however, keep traditional
health care options out of reach from female college students. These
women often rely on student health insurance plans to offset medical
costs even though few student health plans include coverage for birth
control drugs and devices. Part II introduces Title IX, as amended by
the Civil Rights Restoration Act, and proposes a rubric for challenging
discriminatory student health plans under that statute. Part III predicts
some defenses that might be raised to a claim that restrictions on cover-
19. See Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at 1.
20. Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance For Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV.
363 (1998).
21. See ACLU Support Health Equity in Contraceptive Coverage, available in <http:II
www.aclu-wa.org/legislative/Alerts/lntro/InsuranceEquity.stml>.
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age for prescription contraceptive services and supplies violates Title IX
and then goes on to explain the shortcomings of these defenses. This
Article concludes in Part IV by proposing a schedule of benefits that
might be incorporated into student health benefits plans. The proposed
plan complies with Title IX by emphasizing coverage that is clear, com-
pulsory, complete, and comprehensive, to ensure that every college-age
woman's choice of "birth control" is tailored to her particular needs and
life style.
I. HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES
The health care financing scheme in the United States facilitates
access to and financing for prescription contraceptives. The two main
vehicles of contraceptive financing, employer-based group plans and
public-sector subsidies, channel services towards older wealthier women
on the one hand, and adolescent lower-income women on the other.22
While both forms of medical assistance make available a relatively com-
prehensive package of family planning services to their target popula-
tions, middle-income college-age women rarely qualify as eligible
beneficiaries. In the end, the health care financing system leaves post-
secondary women with a Hobsian choice: forego health care coverage
altogether or enroll in a student-based program that unfairly excludes
coverage for prescription contraceptives.
A. Private Insurance Coverage
Nearly 200 million people finance health care costs through
independent or employer-sponsored insurance plans.23 While twenty-
five million people obtain medical coverage through independent private
policies, 24 the vast majority - just over 165 million - finance health
care costs by participating in employer-sponsored group health plans.25
In the late 1980s, rising premium costs may have forced many working
families with access to employer-based coverage to disenroll.26 Yet,
even after a decade of decline in the number of individuals with group-
based coverage, employee-sponsored insurance programs remain the
22. See infra text accompanying notes 44-49, 67-72.
23. In 1997, 188.5 million people were enrolled in private insurance plans. See BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY, MARCH SUPPLEMENT (1998) [hereinafter MARCH
SUPPLEMENT].
24. In 1997, a total of 8.7 percent of all persons were insured under independent private plans.
See Bennefield, supra note 1, at 1.
25. In 1997, 165.1 million people were covered either in their own name or as a dependent
under an employer-based insurance plan. See MARCH SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, tbl. NC6.
26. See AFL-CIO, PAYING MORE AND LOSING GROUND: How EMPLOYER COST SHIFTING IS
ERODING HEALTH COVERAGE OF WORKING FAMILIES 16 (1999) [hereinafter AFL-CIO].
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predominate healthcare financing vehicle. 7
Employer-sponsored medical benefits packages take a variety of
forms, the most prevalent being the managed care health plan.28 Ever
since the federal government began encouraging its development in
1973, managed care has gained a near monopoly over the health benefits
market.2 9 Managed care organizations administer roughly fifty percent
of employer-sponsored plans 30 and provide coverage to nearly sixty-
seven million workers and their families.31 In 1997, eighty-five percent
of workers32 and seventy-three percent of all commercially insured indi-
viduals were enrolled in managed care health plans.33
Cost sharing mechanisms common to group health plans apportion
premium expenses between the employer and employee at a ratio of
about eight to one.34 The cost to employees of participating in an
employer-sponsored health plan remains significantly less than the cost
27. See Bennefield, supra note 1, at 2; Paul Fronstin, The Decline in Health Insurance and
Labor Market Trends, STATISTICAL BULLETIN No. 3 (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.) July 18, 1996 at
1.
28. "Managed care" generally refers to a payment system whereby the health plan attempts to
control or coordinate health services used by its enrolled members in order to contain medical
costs. See BETH C. FUCHS, MANAGED HEALTH CARE: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION, CONG.
RES. SERVICE (Oct. 8, 1997). Managed care organizations come in a variety of forms, including:
Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs"),
Provider Sponsored Organizations ("PSOs"), and Point-of-Service Options ("POSs").
Beneficiaries of such programs must relinquish varying degrees of autonomy with respect to
health care decisionmaking, depending upon the provider network selected. For a detailed
description of managed care options, see Curtis D. Rooney, The States, Congress, or the Courts:
Who Will Be First to Reform ERISA Remedies?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 79-81 (1998); RACHEL
GOLD & F.L. RICHARDS, Improving the Fit: Reproductive Health Services in Managed Care
Settings 5-9; ISSUES IN BRIEF ALAN GUTITMACHER INST., March 1996, at 1-4.
29. See Health Maintenance Organizations Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994).
30. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, A LOOK AT EMPLOYERS' COSTS OF PROVIDING HEALTH
BENEFITS 2 (1996) [hereinafter EMPLOYERS' COSTS]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, Tbl. 183, at 126 [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS].
In 1995, the average cost per employee (both employers' and employees' share) of participating in
an HMO was nineteen percent, or $804.00 lower than traditional indemnity plans. See
EMPLOYERS' COST, supra at 3. The average cost for coverage in a PPO was eighteen percent, or
$781.00 lower than a traditional indemnity plan. See id; see also FOSTER HIGGINS 1996 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF EMPLOYER SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS 5-7 (1995). Nonetheless, the real average
deductible payed by employees in HMO plans rose eight percent between 1989 and 1993, from
$202.00 to $218.00 respectively. See EMPLOYERS' COSTS, supra at 4.
31. ELSEWHERE IN MANAGED CARE, HEALTH LAW NEWS 23 (Jan. 1998). By 1997, just over
fifteen percent of workers were enrolled in traditional indemnity plans. See Health Benefits Costs
Rise in 1997, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REP. No. 1 (1998).
32. See Rooney, supra note 28, at 79.
33. See R.B. Gold et al., Mainstreaming Contraceptive Services in Managed Care, Five
States Perspectives, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 204, 204 (1998); G.A. Jensen et al., The New
Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 125, 126 (1997).
34. In 1994, the average employer contributed eighty percent of the premium costs for
employee coverage in an HMO, eighty-three percent for coverage in a PPO, and eighty-eight
percent for coverage in a fee for service plan. See EMPLOYERS' COSTS, supra note 30, at 6.
[Vol. 54:157
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of obtaining non-group coverage. One national labor organization esti-
mates the employee's annual contribution to be $453.00 for individual
coverage, and $1,615.00 for family coverage.35 With the transition to
managed care, however, employers are shifting the risk of health care
inflation to employees 36 by increasing policy deductibles and co-pay-
ments, and thereby compounding the actual expense of participating in a
group plan.37
The proliferation of managed care as the dominant employer spon-
sored health care option, while not without its drawbacks, 38 has positive
implications for the accessibility and financing of contraceptive drugs
and devices. A majority of health maintenance organizations cover the
most common types of reversible contraception. 39  Specifically, eighty-
four percent of HMOs that provide coverage for prescription drugs pro-
vide equal coverage for oral contraceptive pills.4 ° By comparison,
almost one-half of all fee-for-service arrangements which cover the
costs of prescription drugs exclude coverage for the most commonly
prescribed contraceptives.41 A full two-thirds of conventional plans
exclude coverage for birth control pills.4" On balance, coverage for the
full range of birth control drugs and devices under managed care, while
not comprehensive, far outweighs contraceptive coverage under tradi-
tional indemnity plans.4 3
Women participate in employer-sponsored managed care plans in
significant numbers, either as direct beneficiaries or as dependents of
covered employees, and are reimbursed for a substantial portion of out-
35. See AFL-CIO, supra note 26, at 16.
36. See id. at 9; STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 30, tbl. 182, at 125.
37. See AFL-CIO, supra note 26, at 3.
38. A recent study found that one in three managed care enrollees experienced some degree
of difficulty in obtaining contraceptive services through their plan. The most common complaints
related to costs, confidentiality, delay, or denial of services. See Gold et al., supra note 33, at 209-
210. Perhaps these inadequacies stem from the perverse incentive created by the managed care
financing scheme where the marginal revenue of a medical procedure is zero: "From a short-term
financial standpoint... the [managed care organization's] incentive is to keep you healthy but if
you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state involving few medical expenses, to
let you die as quickly and cheaply as possible." Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wis. v.
Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995).
39. See UNEVEN & UNEQUAL, supra note 6, at 9.
40. See id. at 9.
41. See id. at 12. Only fifteen percent of traditional indemnity plans cover the costs of the
five reversible contraceptive methods. See id.
42. See id. at 16.
43. For example, while thirty-nine percent of HMOs cover all five reversible methods of
contraception - oral contraceptives, IUD, Norplant, DepoProvera and diaphragm - only thirty-
three percent of POS networks, eighteen percent of PPOs and fifteen percent of indemnity plans
provide such coverage. See Rachel Benson Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private
Insurance Coverage for Contraception, THE GUTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, No. 4 (The
Alan Guttmacher Institute), August 1998, at 2. See also SURVEY OF WOMEN, supra note 1, at 3.
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of-pocket contraceptive costs. Eighty-two million women, including
three-fourths of all women within the reproductive age bracket, receive
health care from group providers.44 Because most private insurance is
linked to employment, however, these women tend to be employed full
time,45 or have a life-partner who is employed.46 For the same reason,
older women are more likely to be covered by private insurance than
younger women,47 as are women from higher economic backgrounds
than women with relatively lower incomes.48 The proportion of women
with private individual coverage is lowest among unemployed single
women.
49
B. Government Subsidized Health Care
A substantial number of women in lower income brackets receive
health care, including contraceptive services and devices, through a net-
work of publicly financed family planning providers.5 0 The Medicaid
program 5I alone subsidizes the health care and pregnancy prevention
44. See MARCH SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, at 3; PREGNANCY, CONTRACEPTION AND FAMILY
PLANNING, supra note 1, at 85. Women between the ages of fifteen and forty-five are considered
to be of reproductive age. See id.
45. Full-time employment bears a direct correlation to insurance coverage, with three times as
many full-time workers covered by employment-based health plans than part-time workers (62%
and 18.6% respectively). See Sarah C. Snider, The Part-time Work-force and its Workers' Health
and Pension Benefits, STATISTICAL BULLETIN No. 3 (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.) July 1995, at 22.
46. A number of states, municipalities, and private corporations, including Microsoft, Levi-
Strauss, Xerox, IBM, Walt Disney, and Chevron extend employee benefits to married workers, as
well as same-sex domestic partners. See James P. Baker, Equal Benefits for Equal Work? The
Law of Domestic Partner Benefits, A.B.A. LAB. LAW. 1 (1998); see also Cindy Tobisman,
Marriage vs. Domestic Partnership: Will We Ever Protect Lesbian Families?, 12 BERKLEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 112, 116 (1997).
47. See PREGNANCY, CONTRACEPTION AND FAMILY PLANNING, supra note 1, at 85. Roughly
eighty percent of women covered by private insurance are over thirty years of age, compared to
less than sixty-six percent who are under age twenty-five. See id.
48. See id. Over 90% of women with incomes at or above 250% of the poverty level were
covered by private insurance, compared to 26% percent of women with incomes below 100% of
poverty. See id.
49. See id. In 1997, 28.4% of poor women, or 14.8% of women generally, in the United
States were uninsured, with young adults between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four least likely
to have health coverage. See Bennefield, supra note 1, at 2.
50. See S.K. Henshaw and A. Torres, Family Planning Agencies: Services, Policies and
Funding, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 52 (1994). In addition to the Medicaid and Title X program,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 51-72, hospital outpatient clinics, health department
clinics, Planned Parenthood clinics, and community and migrant health centers constitute major
health care resources for Medicaid recipients and other low-income women. See id. at 52-53. See
also, Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at 6.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994). The Medicaid program is a joint federal and state initiative
to provide health care services to eligible low-income Americans. States participating in the
program establish and administer a plan for medical assistance in accordance with federal
guidelines, and pay participating healthcare providers for certain services rendered to eligible
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costs of nearly seventeen million low-income women annually,5 2 includ-
ing sixteen percent of all women of reproductive age.53 An additional
4.2 million women are eligible to receive discounted reproductive health
and contraceptive services at family planning clinics supported by Title
X operating grants.54
The costs of providing general health care and contraceptive serv-
ices through Medicaid and under the Title X program are absorbed pri-
marily by the public.5 Combined federal and state Medicaid
expenditures top $160 billion annually, 56 with a substantial amount allo-
cated towards contraceptive costs. 57 Federal funding for eligible Title X
clinics exceeds $118 million.58 Only a portion of the cost of providing
contraceptive supplies and services is borne directly by Medicaid benefi-
ciaries and clinic clientele. Under provisions of both the Medicaid and
Title X programs, less needy women who seek clinic services are
assessed a discounted fee proportionate to their income status.5 9 Women
whose income falls below 100 percent of poverty are provided services
free of charge.6 °
individuals. In turn, the federal government reimburses participating states for a portion of their
Medicaid expenditures.
52. See MARCH SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, at tbl. NC6.
53. See Gold et al., supra note 33, at 204.
54. See Lisa Kaeser, Title X and the U.S. Family Planning Effort; 1997 The Alan Guttmacher
Instit. 4. Administered by the Department of Health and Human Services, the Title X Family
Planning Program operates by awarding federal project grants to public and private nonprofit
organizations that provide contraceptive services, as well as training, technical assistance and
other family planning support to low and middle-income women. See id.
55. Most agencies that receive Title X funding also receive funds from other public sources
including the federal Maternal and Child Health program, Social Services Block grants, and state
and community health care programs. See Forrest & Samara, supra note 18, at 188; Kaeser, supra
note 54, at 1, 2.
56. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES, tbl.
10 (1998). In 1997, Federal Medicaid expenditures reached 91.1 billion, while state and local
government expenditures topped 61.2 billion. See id.
57. In 1994, approximately $322 million worth of contraceptive funding was expended
through the Medicaid program. See Katharine Levit et al., Trends, National Health Expenditures
in 1997: More Slow Growth, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 1998. In 1987, total public sector
expenditures for contraceptive services totaled $412 million. See Publicly Funded Contraceptive
Services, supra note 18, at 188.
58. See Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at 6; Jennifer J. Frost, Family Planning Clinic
Services in the United States, 1994, 28 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 92, 92 (1996).
59. See Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at 10. At publicly funded clinics, women whose
income falls between 100-250% of poverty are charged discounted fees "based on ability to pay."
42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (a)(7) (1998). Charges to women whose annual income exceeds 250% of
poverty are made in accordance with a fee schedule designed to recover "the reasonable costs" of
providing services. See id. The median fee charged to low-income women is about $20.00 for an
initial contraceptive examination, $10.00 for pill supplies. Women with incomes of 250% of
poverty or more are assessed about $60.00 for an initial exam, $22.00 for oral contraceptives. See
Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at 6.
60. Eighty-nine percent of agencies awarded Title X operating grants provide initial
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:157
By federal mandate, both the Medicaid and Title X programs make
the provision of family planning and pregnancy prevention services to
low-income women an organizational priority.6" Full implementation of
this mandate is carried out by a series of legislative initiatives and policy
guidelines, including a 1972 Amendment to the Medicaid statute that
made coverage for medically approved contraceptive devices, supplies,
and related care a mandatory component of all state programs.62 Liberal
reimbursement rates encourage compliance with the family planning
mandate. States are reimbursed for ninety percent of the costs of provid-
ing family planning services, nearly double the matching rate for non-
family planning related benefits.63 In addition, cost-sharing require-
ments, which could otherwise be implemented for covered benefits, are
prohibited for Medicaid funded family planning services.6' The provi-
sion of "medically approved family planning methods and services,"65
including contraceptive supplies and devices, is also a mandatory pro-
gram requirement for Title X clinic funding.66
The primary beneficiaries of publicly funded medical assistance
programs are categorically needy women and adolescents. Notwith-
standing continued federal eligibility expansions,67 the average income
contraceptive counseling examinations free of charge to clients whose income falls below 75% of
the federal poverty level; 87% assess no charge for oral contraceptives. Only four percent provide
free examinations to women whose income is above 250% of poverty. See Frost & Bolzan, supra
note 17, at 12, 13. Under Medicaid, user fees are also assessed pursuant to a cost-sharing
mechanism. With regard to certain beneficiaries, "there may be imposed an enrollment fee,
premium, or similar charge, which is related to the individual's income." 42 U.S.C. § 13960
(b)(1) (1994). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13960 (a)(1) (1994), (2); 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (a)(6) (1998).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (a)(5) (1998).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a)(4)(C) (1994).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (a)(5) (1994). Services reimbursed at the ninety percent "family
planning" services rate include: patient counseling and education, examination, treatment,
medically approved methods, procedures, pharmaceutical supplies and devices to prevent
conception, and infertility services including sterilization and reversals. See id.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 13960 (a)(2)(D) (1994); see Gold et al., supra note 33, at 205.
65. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (a)(l) (1998); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (a)(5) (1998).
66. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (a)(10)(b) (1998). Family planning clinics typically offer a range of
prescription contraceptives to clients. Oral contraceptives are universally available at publicly
supported family planning clinics, while other commonly prescribed contraceptive products are
available at a majority of clinics: 99% provide depo-provera, 96% provide the diaphragm, 63%
provide Norplant. See Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at tbl. 1. Fewer than 50% of clinics provide
the LUD, emergency contraception pills, female condoms, cervical caps, and tubal ligation. See
id., see also Kaeser, supra note 54, at 3; S.K. Henshaw and A. Torres, Family Planning Agencies:
Services, Policies and Funding, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 52-59 (1994).
67. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6204, 103 Stat.
2106 (1989), raised the mandatory eligibility level to 133% of poverty, and gave states the option
of increasing eligibility to 185% of poverty. See, Forrest & Samara, supra note 18 at 188;
Jennifer J. Frost et al., State Implementation of the Medicaid Eligibility Expansions for Pregnant
Women, 1993 ALAN Gu-'rMACHER INST. 14-15 (discussing impact of expanded eligibility on state
Medicaid programs).
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ceiling for Medicaid eligibility stands at forth-six percent of the federal
poverty level.68 In 1997, more than half of Medicaid enrollees living at
or below the federal poverty level were women.69 Services at publicly
funded family planning clinics are also geared towards and dispropor-
tionately utilized by adolescents and economically disadvantaged
women.70 Sixty percent of clients specifically seeking contraceptive
services at publicly funded clinics have incomes below poverty, 71 and
almost one-half are under the age of nineteen.72
C. Middle-Income College-Age Women Lack Access to
Contraceptive Financing
Middle-income college-age women are least likely to qualify for
benefits under conventional health care financing schemes. Although a
majority of women pursuing a post-secondary education are employed,73
most work part-time in temporary and low paying jobs where health
insurance is not offered as a compensation benefit. 74 Likewise, few col-
lege-age women qualify for indirect group-based coverage under a par-
ent's plan. Dependent coverage typically extends only to full time
students, leaving 3.6 million women enrolled part-time in post-secon-
dary degree programs ineligible for coverage.
68. See Kaeser, supra note 54, at 2.
69. See MARCH SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, at 6.
70. See Forrest & Samara, supra note 18, at 8; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, BEST INTENTIONS:
UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 231 (Sarah S.
Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995). An evaluation of twenty-three of the most successful
community outreach programs geared towards reducing unwanted pregnancies found that nine out
of ten clinics operating at the national level targeted outreach efforts to teenage clients. Almost
none of the programs had a clear focus on meeting the unmet contraceptive needs of adults. See
Carol J. Rowland Hogue, Missing the Boat on Pregnancy Prevention, 13 ISSUES IN ScI. & TECH.
41, 46 (1997).
71. See Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at 8. Data for 1994 and 1995 indicate that among
clients overall, fifty-seven percent have family incomes below the federal poverty level, and one-
third have family incomes between 100-250% of poverty. However, only one-quarter of these
clients are Medicaid recipients. See id.
72. Public family planning clinics are a primary source of contraceptives for more than 60%
of older teens. See Forrest & Samara, supra note 18, at 193.
73. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 30, No. 320, at 198. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics indicates that fewer than 50% of full-time and 82% of part-time college students are
labor force participants. See INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF AMERICA, PARENTS, COLLEGE
STUDENTS & INSURANCE: A NATIONAL SURVEY (1997) [hereinafter COLLEGE STUDENTS].
74. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION,
Supp. tbl. 50-3 (1997); Taking Stock in America's Youth, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
STATISTICAL BULLETIN, No. 2 (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.), April 1, 1995; see also NEXT STEP,
supra note 1, at 2.
75. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
1997, tbl. 177 (1998); see also LAURA H. HORN & C. DENNIS CARROL, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, NONTRADITIONAL UNDERGRADUATES: TRENDS IN ENROLLMENT FROM
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Increases in non-traditional student enrollment is another reason
why middle-income college-age women do not qualify for group-based
insurance coverage.76 More than six million older students, most of
them women,7 7 forfeit indirect coverage upon reaching the maximum
age of eligibility set by group underwriters.78 Women matriculating
after a period of work-force participation fare no better, notwithstanding
previous enrollment in an employer-sponsored plan, because health
insurance portability rules applicable to discharged workers do not apply
when an employee voluntarily leaves the workforce to participate in a
program of higher education.7 9
Just as college-age women are not likely to qualify for employer-
sponsored group health insurance, it is equally likely that they will not
meet the eligibility guidelines for publicly subsidized contraceptive care.
To qualify for Medicaid in most states, a woman must be a single
mother or be pregnant and have an income below state requirements.8 °
To qualify for discounted services at Title X clinics, a woman must meet
strict income guidelines set far below the median family income of most
post-secondary students.8 For those women who do qualify for dis-
counted family planning services, few health clinics tailor services to
meet the contraceptive needs of adult females.8" As a result, neither the
Medicaid program nor publicly funded clinics serve as a practical family
planning resource for post-secondary women.83
This combination of age, income, and employment related eligibil-
ity criteria explains why, in large part, college-age women are, more
1986 TO 1992 AND PERSISTENCE AND ATrAINMENT AMONG 1989-1990 BEGINNING POST
SECONDARY STUDENTS 19-20 (1996).
76. See HORN & CARROL, supra note 75, at 19-20.
77. In 1996, 6.24 million students age 25 and older were enrolled in higher education
programs. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 30, tbl. 256, at 165, tbl. 304, at 190; see
HORN & CARROL, supra note 75, at 9, 15.
78. Most employer plans limit indirect coverage to dependents under age 23. See COLLEGE
STUDENTS, supra note 73, at 2.
79. See Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 82 (1985) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)).
COBRA mandates that under certain circumstances a discharged worker may be entitled to
continued medical insurance under the employer's health plan for up to three years after
termination; see Paul Fronstin Individuals with COBRA Coverage, 1994-1995 STATISTICAL
BULLETIN No. 2 (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.), April, 1998 (surveying the beneficiaries of
COBRA).
80. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a (a)(10)(A) (1994); Kaeser, supra note 54, at 2.
81. For example, the family income of the average undergraduate students attending the
University of California is reportedly $62,000.00 per year. Nearly one-fourth of students come
from families with annual incomes higher than $90,000.00. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Proposal
for Free College Tuition Isn't as Egalitarian as it Seems, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 24, 1998,
A04.
82. See Hogue, supra note 70, at 42.
83. See Frost & Bolzan, supra note 17, at 8; SURVEY OF WOMEN, supra note 1, at 3.
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than any other identifiable group, least likely to qualify for private or
public health subsidies, and thereby least likely to obtain financing for
contraceptive services.
D. Student Health Insurance Plans: A Major Source of Insurance
Coverage for Women
Student health insurance plans offer a practical and cost effective
health care financing alternative for post-secondary women who do not
qualify for group-based coverage or publicly funded services. For
example, each of the fifteen four year institutions with the highest stu-
dent enrollment in the United States permit eligible students to enroll in
a university sponsored health plan, either on a voluntary basis or as a
pre-condition of matriculation.84 Although significantly less expensive
than the cost of obtaining traditional coverage, 85 student health benefits,
particularly those relating to contraceptive services, are limited. Of the
fifteen plans surveyed, only one plan provides coverage for prescription
84. See UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN 1998-99 [hereinafter
MINNESOTA]; OHIO STATE STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 1999-2000 [hereinafter
OHIO]; UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE 1998-99 INSURED'S GUIDE
[hereinafter TEXAS]; ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE 1999-2000
[hereinafter ARIZONA STATE]; HEALTH ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS PLAN FOR STUDENTS AND THEIR
DEPENDENTS OF THE TEXAS A& M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM 1999-2000 [hereinafter TEXAS A & MI;
PENN STATE UNIVERSITY, STUDENT INJURY AND SICKNESS INSURANCE PLAN 1999-2000
[hereinafter PENN]; UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, STUDENT INJURY AND SICKNESS INSURANCE PLAN
1999-2000 [hereinafter FLORIDA]; UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, SHIP DOMESTIC 1999-2000
[hereinafter WISCONSIN]; UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 1998-99 STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE
[hereinafter ILLINOIS]; UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN BROCHURE
1998-99 [hereinafter UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN]; DOMESTIC STUDENT INJURY AND SICKNESS
INSURANCE PLAN, PURDUE UNIVERSITY 1998-99 [hereinafter PURDUE]; NEW YORK UNIVERSITY,
STUDENT HEALTH SERVICES AND INSURANCE INFORMATION 1999-2000 [hereinafter NEW YORK];
UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA, STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE 1998-99 [hereinafter INDIANA];
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA STUDENT INJURY AND SICKNESS EXCESS INSURANCE 1999-
2000 [hereinafter SOUTHERN FLORIDA]; UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE
1998-99 [hereinafter UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA]. The U.S. Department of Education Statistics
ranked the foregoing post-secondary educational institutions among those with the highest student
enrollment based on statistics for the fall 1995 semester. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 225 (1997).
85. As indicated in the respective University's student health insurance handbook, the
following premiums were charged per individual student coverage during the 1999-2000 academic
year: Arizona State, $302.00 (per semester); University of Arizona, $302.00 (per semester);
University of Florida, $175.00 - $ 888.00 (per annum); University of Illinois, $127.00 (per
quarter); University of Indiana, $319.00 (per annum); University of Michigan, $585.00 (per
annum) (1998-1999); University of Minnesota, $216.00 (per quarter) (1998-1999); New York
University, $453.00 - $1084.00 (per annum); Ohio State University, $297.00 (per semester);
Pennsylvania State University, $622.00 (per annum); Purdue University, $655.00 - $954.00 (per
annum); Southern Florida, $631.00 (per annum); Texas A & M, $620.00 - $812.00 (per annum);
University of Texas, Austin, $435.00 (per annum); University of Wisconsin, Madison, $795.00 -
$1928.00 (per annum).
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contraceptives on par with other prescription medications.86 Three
include coverage for prescription contraceptives, but impose additional
deductibles or co-payments when prescription contraceptives are
obtained from off-campus providers.87 Two plans limit coverage by
reducing the cap on reimbursements applicable to prescription contra-
ceptives. 8   Nine plans expressly exclude coverage for birth control
drugs and devices.89
This exclusion of contraceptive coverage under student health
insurance plans is particularly troubling given the acute need for contra-
ceptive financing among middle-income college-age women. Almost all
of the eight million women currently enrolled in programs of higher
education are in their prime child bearing years,9" and the majority face
a high risk of unintended pregnancy. 9t In fact, among women between
86. See WISCONSIN, supra note 84.
87. The University of Minnesota plan, for example, charges a $12.00 co-payment for the
costs of prescriptions obtained at the student health services center. However, students bear full
responsibility for the costs of prescription contraceptives obtained elsewhere. See MINNESOTA,
supra note 84, at 10, 11. The Ohio State Plan requires a $10.00 co-payment when contraception
prescriptions are filled by an off campus provider, see OHIO, supra note 84, and the Texas A & M
plan reduces reimbursement rates by ten percent when medical care is sought from a provider
outside the network. See TEXAS A & M, supra note 84, at 2. Policies that limit compensation for
medical services obtained off-campus or by an out of network provider discriminate against
women even when the limitations apply regardless of whether the services sought relate to family
planning. This is so university health clinics rarely make the full range of contraceptive options
available, thereby forcing women to incur an added expense for prescription drugs under the plan.
88. For example, University of Texas plan charges a co-payment of $2.00 - $5.00 for generic
drugs, and $5.00 - $10.00 for name brand drugs dispensed at the student health center. However,
the insurance company contributes a maximum of only $3.00 toward the cost of birth control pills.
See TEXAS, supra note 84, at 11. In addition, expenses for prescription drugs dispensed at the
student health center are reimbursed up to a $300.00 maximum per policy year, while
prescriptions dispensed outside the student health center, including prescription contraceptives
unavailable on campus, are limited to $210.00 per year. See id. Under the University of Michigan
plan, prescription drugs are reimbursed up to a maximum of $1,000.00 per policy year, but
coverage for prescription contraceptives is "not to exceed $200.00 per policy year." UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN, supra note 84, at 21.
89. See PURDUE, supra note 84, at 8; ILLINOIS, supra note 84, at 13; PENN, supra note 84, at 9;
NEW YORK, supra note 84, at 25; SOUTHERN FLORIDA, supra note 84, at 9; UNIVERSITY OF
ARIZONA, supra note 84, at 9; ARIZONA STATE, supra note 84; FLORIDA, supra note 84, at inset;
INDIANA, supra note 84, at 6.
90. Between 1983 and 1996, the number of women pursuing higher education degrees
increased 25%, from 6.4 million to eight million respectively. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATION STATISTICS, PROJECTIONS OF EDUCATION STATISTICS TO 2008, at 2; DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 1997, TABLE 172; STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra note 30, No. 252, at
162. Of the total number of women enrolled in programs of higher education in 1996, 7.8 million
were between the ages of twenty to twenty-nine. See id., No. 256, at 165.
91. Women at risk of unintended pregnancy are defined as: 1) having had sexual intercourse;
2) fertile, i.e., neither they nor their partner has been contraceptively sterilized and are not infertile
for any other reason; and, 3) neither intentionally pregnant nor trying to become pregnant. See
Forrest & Samara, supra note 70, tbl. 29, at 28. Figures for 1990 placed the following number of
women at risk for unintended pregnancy: 2.5 million women between the ages of 18-19; 14.1
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the ages of twenty and twenty-nine, the risk of unintended pregnancy is
higher for middle-income women than for women of any other financial
strata.92 Over fifty-percent of the pregnancies that occur among non-
poor college-age women are unintended.93 This data underscores the
urgency of making the availability of contraceptive financing for mid-
dle-income college-age women a national family planning priority.
H. TITLE IX AND DISCRIMINATION IN CONTRACEPTION COVERAGE
This part of the Article considers the meaning of sex discrimination
under Title IX in the context of university sponsored health insurance
programs that provide comprehensive coverage for prescription medica-
tion generally but exclude coverage for prescription contraceptives, sup-
plies and services. Applying a disparate impact proof model to student
insurance plans demonstrates how the refusal to reimburse for the costs
of prescription contraceptives forces women to bear a disproportionate
share of health care costs. The following section will consider possible
defenses an educational institution might raise against a claim that a
student health insurance plan discriminates against women in violation
of Title IX.
A. The Basic Title IX Claim
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in certain institutions of higher
education. The statute reads, "[N]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance."94 This prohibition on sex discrimination
extends to "all the operations" of the institution, including operations
million women between the ages of 20-29; 11.8 million women between the ages of 30-44. See
id. at 29-30.
92. The correlation between the risk of unintended pregnancy and economic status varies with
age. Women who are financially capable of pursuing a post-secondary education are at a
relatively higher risk of unintended pregnancy than other women in their age group. Three fourths
of women in their twenties living at 2.5 times or more above the poverty level are at risk of
unintended pregnancy, compared with two thirds of women in their twenties living below the
poverty level. Slightly lower proportions of less affluent women under twenty are at risk. Among
females aged thirteen to nineteen, a higher proportion of teens from families in poverty are at risk;
forty-six percent of teens between fifteen to seventeen with incomes below the poverty level are at
risk of unintended pregnancy, compared with about one third of teens with family incomes at or
above 2.5 times the poverty level. See Forrest & Samara, supra note 70, at 29-30.
93. See id. at 31. In 1988, the majority of pregnancies occurring among women from middle-
income backgrounds were unintended; 64% of the total number of unwanted pregnancies occurred
among women with incomes at 100-200% of poverty. Among women whose incomes exceeded
200% of the poverty level, 45% of all pregnancies were unintended. Among women aged twenty-
five to thirty-four, between 42 to 45% of all pregnancies were unintended. See id. at 31-33.
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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that are not, by their nature, educational.95
Title IX prohibits educational institutions from discriminating
against women intentionally or explicitly. Sex-specific distinctions in
the provision of student services can be enforced only in limited statuto-
rily enumerated circumstances. 96 The statute also prohibits facially neu-
tral policies and practices that have a discriminatory effect on women.
Proof of discriminatory effect will suffice to establish liability when a
suit is brought to enforce one of the implementing regulations promul-
gated pursuant to Title IX, rather than a specific provision of the statute
itself.9
7
Neither Title IX nor its implementing regulations speak directly to
the terms of contraceptive coverage under university sponsored health
plans. The regulations do, however, prohibit sex discrimination in the
administration of a university sponsored health or medical insurance
"benefit, service, policy or plan".98 Reimbursement for family planning
services that are provided for under such plans must be made on a sex-
neutral basis, even if those services are typically used by women more
than men.99 The regulations also prohibit federally funded colleges and
universities from administering a plan that treats "pregnancy, childbirth,
95. See infra Part III.C.
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(l) - (9) (1994). Excepted from Title IX's sex-neutral mandate
are: educational institutions transitioning from single-sex to co-educational; religious educational
institutions with contrary religious tenets; military service academies; traditionally single-sex
institutions; social fraternities, sororities and voluntary youth organizations; Girls or Boys
conferences; mother-daughter or father-son activities; and, "Beauty" pageant scholarship awards.
See id.
97. Lower courts regularly undertake an impact analysis of facially neutral educational
policies that adversely affect women in breach of Title IX's implementing regulations. See, e.g.,
Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F.Supp. 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (undertaking impact
analysis when regulation specifically contemplates disparate impact claim); Haffer v. Temple
Univ. 678 F.Supp. 517, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying impact theory where implementing
regulation does not specifically require intent); cf., Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881,
883 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying disparate-impact analysis to university employee's Title IX claim);
Marby v. Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ. 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987) (importing Title VII impact analysis to college employee's Title IX
claim); see generally, James S. Wrona, Eradicating Sex Discrimination in Education: Extending
Disparate-Impact Analysis to Title IX Litigation, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (1993). The rule under Title
IX that bars facially neutral practices that have a discriminatory effect on one sex is adapted from
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination
in federally funded programs. In Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983),
the Court ruled that a violation of Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent. A
majority also agreed, however, that proof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish liability
when a suit is brought to enforce the regulations promulgated under the statute. See id; see also
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. Secretary of
Housing, 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court has not ruled, nor has
Congress legislated, as to whether a disparate impact claim is cognizable under Title IX.
98. 34 C.F.R. § 106.39, § 106.40 (1998).
99. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.39 (1998).
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false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom" dif-
ferently than any other temporary disability. °° Furthermore, educa-
tional institutions cannot implement a rule that affects women differently
than men, simply on account of a woman's "actual or potential parental
... status."''" Title IX's implementing regulations therefore support a
disparate impact claim against student based health insurance plans that
discriminate against women. 0 2
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination
under Title IX, a plaintiff must show that the effect of a facially neutral
practice decidedly disfavors one sex. 10 3 The disproportionate burden on
women of excluding prescription contraception from a comprehensive
health plan is apparent. First, all medically prescribed reversible contra-
ceptive methods are used solely by women. 1°4 Thus, women alone
shoulder both the responsibility and the risks associated with obtaining
and utilizing reversible contraception. 105 Even if technology advanced
to make effective prescription contraception available to men, only
women bear the risks associated with unwanted pregnancy.'0 6 Second,
women bear a disproportionate share of health care costs. The average
woman spends approximately sixty-eight percent more than men on out
of pocket medical expenses, a potential lifetime difference of
100. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(4) (1998).
101. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(a) (1998).
102. Sylvia Law argues that because the current state of technology permits prescription
contraception only for women, excluding coverage for prescription contraception under a health
plan that otherwise provides comprehensive prescription coverage amounts to explicit sex
discrimination. See Law, supra note 20, at 374. Because such a claim is grounded in
technological limitations, however, Law considers a disparate impact theory more appropriate.
See id. at 374-75.
103. See Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dept., 709 F.Supp. 345, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
104. See Law, supra note 20, at 374.
105. See id. A majority of men fail in their responsibility to take steps to avoid unwanted
pregnancy, despite that, at least in circumstances involving consensual sex, both women and men
are equally accountable for the conception that might ensue from unprotected intercourse. In
responding to a survey taken by the Kaiser Family Foundation, fifty-seven percent of women
indicated that they alone are responsible for contraceptive use during intercourse. Among the
reasons cited by both women and men respondents for why men fail to take an active role in
pregnancy prevention: "men don't care," (37% of women, 45% of men); "it is the female's
responsibility," (30% of women, 21% of men); "men can't become pregnant," (18% of women,
9% of men). See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SURVEY ON PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND AT-rITUDES ON
CONTRACEPrTION AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 8 (1987). Seventy percent of women in the United
States feel that men are not responsible enough for birth control. See id. at 18.
106. See Law, supra note 20, at 374. Law calculates the risks associated with unintended
pregnancy in terms of "emotional, financial and human costs," as well as "adverse social and
economic consequences." Id. at 367. According to Law, the adverse consequences of unintended
pregnancy include increased infant mortality, morbidity, and low birth weight; increased abortion
rates; high financial costs; limitations on women's ability to contribute to society; and a decline in
the stability of the national economy. See id. at 364-368; see also Coverage for Contraceptives,
supra note 9, at 6.
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$10,000.00.1°7 More than twice as many women than men have out of
pocket health care expenditures that exceed ten percent of their
income. °8 A large portion of this disparity is attributed to the exclusion
of prescription contraceptives from otherwise comprehensive health
benefit plans. 109
B. The Burden Shifts
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate impact claim
under Title IX, the burden shifts to the college or university to justify the
discriminatory policy as an "educational necessity".I" It is unlikely that
an educational institution could make a plausible argument that the
exclusion of prescription contraception coverage from student health
insurance bears a "manifest relationship" to a legitimate educational
goal. I 1
III. POSSIBLE DEFENSES To THE CLAIM THAT TITLE IX APPLIES To
STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS
Although an educational institution would have difficulty building
a defense on an educational necessity theory, other conceivable defenses
might be raised against a plaintiff's claim that the exclusion of coverage
for prescription contraceptives from otherwise comprehensive student
health insurance plans constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title
IX. These defenses might include the following: (1) the refusal to cover
the costs of prescription contraception does not amount to discrimination
on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of
pregnancy and recovery therefrom;"" 2 (2) Title IX's sex-neutral man-
date does not apply when the "education program or activity" under
review is not directly "in receipt of Federal financial assistance;" (3)
Title IX applies only to institutional programs or activities that are edu-
cational in nature, not to the administration of student health insurance
plans; (4) a university is not legally responsible for discriminatory stu-
107. See Snowe & Reid, supra note 7, at 1; WOMEN'S RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTrrTUTE,
WOMEN'S HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS AND EXPERIENCES 2 (1994) [hereinafter WOMEN'S HEALTH
INSURANCE].
108. See Snowe & Reid, supra note 7, at 6.
109. See id. at 10-11.
110. Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dept., 709 F. Supp. 345, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing
Georgia State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. State of Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11 th Cir. 1985));
see also Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1970) (analogizing "education necessity" to
"business necessity").
111. See Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 362 (finding no manifest relationship between awarding merit
scholarships based solely on student SAT scores and academic achievement in high school to
justify disproportionate exclusion of women).
112. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(4) (1998).
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dent health plans, the terms of which are dictated by a third party; and
(5) because health plans that include coverage for birth control drugs
and devices are not commercially unavailable, educational institutions
should not be liable under Title IX for failing to offer such plans. This
section considers these five defenses in turn.
A. The Language of Title IX Does Not Include
Contraception Coverage
The first defense a defendant is likely to raise against a claim that
the exclusion of coverage for prescription contraceptives under student
health insurance plans violates Title IX is the language of Title IX itself.
The implementing regulations of Title IX require sex-neutral treatment
only with respect to official policies that pertain to "pregnancy, child-
birth, false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery there-
from." '113 The absence of any specific reference to "contraception"
underscores the statute's prime purpose of prohibiting discrimination
against women who are already pregnant. 14 An educational institution
might argue that to interpret the regulations as requiring student health
plans to provide coverage for birth control drugs and devices would
impermissibly extend the statute beyond its intended scope." 15
Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination, however, is not
limited to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and its related condi-
tions. While the regulations make no reference to contraception, they
expressly prohibit the application of any rule "concerning a student's
actual or potentia. parental, family, or marital status which treats stu-
dents differently on the basis of sex." '16 By their terms, therefore, the
regulations expressly apply to policies that have a disparate impact on
women who are not yet pregnant, and by implication, they apply to
women who avoid pregnancy through the use of contraceptive drugs and
devices.
Title IX's legislative history further supports the conclusion that
excepting contraceptives from coverage under student health benefit
plans constitutes discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth,
false pregnancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom." In
a 1987 Amendment to the statute, Congress instructed that Title IX was
not to be "construed to force or require any individual or hospital or any
other institution, program, or activity receiving Federal funds to perform
113. Id.
114. See Law, supra note 20, at 377.
115. See Chevron U.5 .A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843,
862 (1984) (requiring consistency between agency regulation and purpose of underlying statute).
116. 34 C.F.R. § 106,40(a) (1998).
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or pay for an abortion." '"17 Reflected in the abortion exclusion is Con-
gress' understanding that a law that prohibits pregnancy discrimination
also prohibits discrimination against women who seek to avoid preg-
nancy.' 18 Absent legislative action, student health benefit plans would
be required to reimburse women for expenses incurred in obtaining an
abortion and related medical services. "9 The Amendment excepts from
Title IX's sex-neutral mandate one particular method of terminating a
pregnancy, without excepting disfavorable treatment of contraceptive
drugs and devices as a method of avoiding pregnancy. 20
Viewed in its historical context, the genesis of Title IX gives
weight to the argument that the statute protects women who seek to
avoid pregnancy, and therefore, requires that student health insurance
plans provide equal coverage for prescription contraceptives. In 1971,
Congress soundly defeated the Equal Rights Amendment which would
have mandated sex equality in virtually every law, policy, or practice.12'
The resulting gap in existing civil rights legislation left exclusionary
education policies intact, subjecting a wave of new female enrollees to
institutionalized discrimination. 2 2 New legislation introduced shortly
117. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259 § 8(b) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1688). For a discussion of a similar exclusion under Title VII for the costs of obtaining abortion
services and the effect of the exclusion on employer-sponsored health plans, see Law, supra note
20, at 379-80.
118. 134 Cong. Rec. § 159, 162 (1988).
119. See id.
120. See North Haven v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521-22 (1982) (refusing to infer additional
exclusions from list of statutorily enumerated exceptions); Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S.
608, 616-17 (1980).
121. The text of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment read, "Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." See
H.R.C.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1971); S. Res. 8, 92d Cong. (1971). First introduced in 1923, the
ERA did not receive serious political consideration until the early 1970s. See Deborah Rhode,
Equal Rights in Retrospect, I L. & EQUITY J. 1, 4-5 (1983); THE EQUAL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUDY (Hazel Greenberg ed., 1977). Since its
defeat in 1982, however, political stirrings among the states seems to point to a renewed interest in
a federal ERA. In 1998, for example, Iowa and Florida passed amendments to expressly include
women in their state constitutions. In that same year, Missouri's general assembly debated
passage of a federal ERA, and legislation calling for the ratification of a federal ERA was
introduced in Illinois and Virginia. See Debra Baker, The Fight Ain't Over, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999,
at 53.
122. As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress enacted broad-based anti-discrimination
legislation including Title VI and Title VII. Title VI prohibits discrimination "on the ground of
race, color, religion or national origin . . . under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex or national origin" in the terms or conditions of employment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-17 (1994). Noticeably absent from either statute is a prohibition on sex discrimination in
federally funded educational institutions. Title IX was widely understood to "close[ ] loopholes in
existing legislation relating to general education programs and employment resulting from those
programs." See 118 Cong. Rec. 5803, 5807 (1972); 117 Cong. Rec. 30403, 30408 (1971). For a
discussion of the politico-social controversies preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act, see
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thereafter took direct aim at discrimination in academia.12 3 While not a
panacea, this legislation expressly intended to hasten full scale female
participation in the country's political, social, and economic power
structure. 
124
Contemporaneous with the introduction of new anti-discrimination
legislation came advancements in contraceptive technology. For the
first time in history, the birth control pill afforded millions of women an
opportunity to safely disaggregate intercourse from procreation.1 25 Title
IX supporters immediately recognized the interdependence of educa-
tional advancement and reproductive choice: "[i]f the only alternative to
child-rearing is discrimination in education and a low paying job, then,
despite the increase in birth control information and the dissemination of
the pill and other devices, too many women will continue to choose to
have too many babies." 126 In light of this history, university health plans
that withhold coverage for birth control drugs and devices defeat the
liberatory promise of Title IX.
No court to date has applied Title IX to a university sponsored
health plan that excludes coverage for prescription contraceptives. 27
The proposition that Title IX protects only women who are already preg-
nant and not women whose actions might lead to or avoid pregnancy,
generally CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
123. See 119 Cong. Rec. 30399 (1971).
124. See 117 Cong. Rec. 39256-39258 (1971). From its inception, Title IX promised women
more than formal educational opportunity. See generally 118 Cong. Rec. 5806 (1972) (describing
unequal work and pay for women as a product of inequality in education). The statute was "an
important first step in the effort to provide for the women of America something that is rightfully
theirs - an equal chance to attend the school of their choice, to develop the skills they want, and to
apply those skills with the knowledge that they will have a fair chance to secure the jobs of their
choice with equal pay for equal work." 118 Cong. Rec. 5808 (1972). It was intended "to provide
women with solid legal protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving
to perpetuate second-class citizenship for American women." 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972).
Thirty years after the enactment of Title IX, sex discrimination in contemporary form continues to
perpetuate the myth of a subordinated female citizenry. See United States v. Virginia Military
Inst., 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (recognizing that military academy's male only admission policy
perpetuates "the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women").
125. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 111-118 (1984)
(discussing social changes induced by the mass availability of the birth control pill); LINDA
GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA
96-102 (1976).
126. 118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972).
127. The vast majority of impact claims arising under Title IX concern sex-based disparities in
the allocation of financial resources and scholarships to female student athletic programs. See
generally Trudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made
Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107 (1998); Crista D. Leahy, The Title Bout: A Critical
Review of the Regulation and Enforcement of Title IX in Intercollegiate Athletics, 24 J.C. & U.L.
489 (1998); William Thro, Still on the Sidelines: Developing the Non-Discrimination Paradigm
under Title IX, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. POL'Y 25-28 (1996).
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however, was rejected by one federal court in Wort v. Vierling.'28 In
Vierling, a local chapter of the National Honor Society dismissed a high
school honor student when school officials discovered that the student
was pregnant.' 29 The student challenged her dismissal pursuant to a
Title IX regulation that prohibits the exclusion of students from extra-
curricular activities on the grounds of "pregnancy, childbirth, false preg-
nancy, termination of pregnancy and recovery therefrom."' 130 The high
school countered that the student's dismissal was not premised on her
"sex" per se, but rather on the fact that she had engaged in pre-marital
sexual activity, conduct that The National Honor Society does not con-
done. In sustaining the student's challenge, the court declined to draw a
factual distinction between Vierling's pregnancy and her underlying sex-
ual conduct. Whether Vierling had been dismissed from the Honor
Society "because of her pregnancy or the acts leading up to her preg-
nancy was irrelevant for purposes of determining whether her dismissal
violated Title IX.'' 13 From the court's perspective, adverse treatment
occasioned by a woman's potential to become pregnant and, by implica-
tion, her ability to avoid pregnancy constitutes discrimination on the
basis of sex.
Applying the rationale from Vierling to a university sponsored stu-
dent health plan demonstrates that the refusal to reimburse women for
contraceptive costs violates Title IX. Neutrality, as required with
respect to health policies affecting women whose actions might lead to
pregnancy, is required with respect to policies affecting women whose
actions might tend to avoid pregnancy. Those actions include the use of
prescription contraceptive devices and services, which must be covered
under comprehensive student benefit plans.
128. Wort v. Vierling, No. 82-3169, slip. op. (C.D. I11. Sept. 4, 1984), aff'd on other grounds,
778 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1985).
129. See id., slip op. at 2.
130. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1) (1998).
131. Vierling, slip op. at 4. Some courts distinguish pre-marital sexual conduct from
pregnancy as a legitimate basis for exclusion from high school activities. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v.
Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 784 (3d Cir. 1990) (excluding pregnant high school
student from chapter of National Honor Society, not "for her pregnancy but because... she failed
to uphold the standards..."). The legitimacy of adverse treatment accorded a student who
engages in pre-marital sex, however, can be discriminatory against female students given that
pregnancy provides per se evidence of sexual activity. Absent a voluntary disclosure, evidence of
sexual activity engaged in by male students is virtually impossible to obtain. See ACLU, ACLU
Files Sex Discrimination Case For Pregnant Teens Denied Honor Society Membership (Aug. 6,
1998) (discussing complaint filed by pregnant high school student dismissed from National Honor
Society), available in <http://www.aclu.org/court/chipman-comp.html>. Furthermore, in the
context of post-secondary education where the majority of students are adults, restrictions on
student behavior, including sexual activity, might be entirely inappropriate. See Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (emphasizing school's enhanced role in regulating
student conduct at high school level).
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B. Title IX Applies to the Specific Program or Activity Receiving
Federal Funds
In addition to claiming that Title IX prohibits only those educa-
tional policies that accord adverse treatment to pregnant women, and
therefore, does not require coverage for prescription contraceptives
under student health plans, institutional defendants could attempt to jus-
tify discriminatory health plans on a second ground. Defendants might
argue that, by its terms, Title IX prohibits sex-discrimination only in the
particular educational program or activity "receiving Federal financial
assistance." '132 Therefore, even if student health plans singled out pre-
scription contraceptives for disfavorable treatment, the university itself
could not be held liable for sex-discrimination so long as federal funds
are not allocated to defray the costs of administering those plans.
1. INSTITUTION WIDE LIABILITY: FROM GROVE CITY TO THE CRRA
A program-specific interpretation of Title IX was advanced by the
plaintiffs in Grove City College v. Bell. 133 In that case, the federal gov-
ernment suspended the college's student financial aid program on
account of its refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance, a required
condition to receiving federal educational funding.1 34 Grove City chal-
lenged the government's decision, arguing that as a private institution
that received no direct federal subsidy, it was under no obligation to
comply with the statute. By its terms, Grove City contended, Title IX
regulates only those specific programs receiving "Federal financial
assistance," 135 and Grove City could not be deemed in receipt of federal
financial assistance "by virtue of the fact that some of its students
receive 'financial aid grants.' 1 36
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Grove City that the
receipt of federal funds by some of its students "does not trigger institu-
tion wide coverage under Title IX."1 37 As an institution, Grove City
would not be subject to Title IX "merely ... because one of its depart-
ments received an earmarked federal grant."1 38 At the same time, how-
ever, the Court identified the department administering student aid
grants as the education program or activity "receiving" federal assist-
ance. It concluded that that department may be properly regulated under
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
133. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
134. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 559-60.
135. Id. at 561.
136. Id. at 562.
137. Id. at 574.
138. Id. at 572.
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Title IX.139
Congress later rejected the "program-specific" aspect of Grove City
by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 [CRRA]. 4 ° The
CRRA amends Title IX by redefining the term "program or activity" to
include "all of the operations of ... a college, university, or other post-
secondary institution.., any part of which is extended federal financial
assistance."'' Where colleges or universities are concerned, the CRRA
makes "the entire educational institution" the "program or activity" sub-
ject to Title IX's anti-discrimination mandate. 42
The CRRA implicitly endorses the logic and reasoning of the two
Grove City dissenters. According to the dissent in Grove City, because
federal financial assistance is meant "to provide funds that will benefit
colleges and universities as a whole ... the entire undergraduate institu-
tion is subject to the antidiscrimination provisions included in Title
IX."'
14 3 A "program-specific" approach to Title IX liability would pro-
hibit educational institutions from "discriminating on the basis of sex in
[their] own 'financial aid program'," but leave colleges and universities
"free to discriminate in other 'programs or activities operated by the
institution.' ""'4 Mimicking that concern, CRRA supporters in Congress
warned that a compartmentalized approach to Title IX liability would
have allowed educational institutions to discriminate with one hand as
long as they do not discriminate with the other. ' 45 They recognized that
the decision in Grove City essentially halted enforcement of the nation
civil rights laws "by allowing schools [and] other institution to isolate
discrimination, to cubbyhole it."' 46 Evaluating particular programs or
activities in isolation from the educational institution as a whole would
run counter to the spirit and underlying purpose of Title IX. 4 7
In sum, if one arm of a university receives federal financial assist-
ance, the CRRA's institution-wide approach to liability prohibits dis-
crimination throughout the "entire entity."'' 48 Accordingly, a university
is liable under Title IX for offering discriminatory student health bene-
139. See id. at 573-74.
140. See Pub. L. 100-259, 3 (a), § 908, 102 Stat. 28, 28-29 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1687).
141. See id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (a).
142. See 134 Cong. Rec. E1049-01 (1988).
143. Grove City v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 599 (1984) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
144. Id. at 601.
145. 134 Cong. Rec. H565, 579 (1987).
146. 134 Cong. Rec. H565-02 (March 2, 1988).
147. See 134 Cong. Rec. S159 (1987).
148. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 271 (6th Cir. 1994);
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993).
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fits whenever any part of the institution receives federal financial
assistance.
C. The "Operation" Must Be Educational In Nature
A third defense to acclaim that a student health plan discriminates
against women by excluding coverage for prescription contraceptives is
the argument that the statute applies expressly to the academic functions
of covered entities but not to the administrative functions, such as the
provision of student health benefits. This defense would emphasize that
in redefining the phrase "program or activity" to include "all of the oper-
ations of' a covered institution, the CRRA left the modifier "education"
intact. Congress thereby indicated its intent to regulate only those oper-
ations that are part aid parcel of the institution's academic mission.
Accordingly, the administration of student health benefit plans falls
outside the ambit of Title IX.
Besides contradicting Congress' directive under the CRRA that the
"education program or activity is the entire college, university or system
of higher education," '149 this defense overstates the relevance of the term
"education." That term is meant to characterize the type of entity regu-
lated by Title IX, rather than the nature of the operation subject to the
statute's anti-discrimination mandate. This becomes clear when the stat-
ute is read in its entirety. 50
In addition to "institutions of higher education," Title IX regulates
the operations of hospitals, private corporations, and instrumentalities of
state and local government that are allotted federal financial assist-
ance."'1 As the Second Circuit explained, the phrase "education pro-
gram or activity" serves to delineate the scope of the statute as applied to
the latter group of entities. "[T]aken together, the phrase 'education pro-
gram or activity' indicates that in order to implicate Title IX in the first
instance, an entity must have features such that one could reasonably
consider its mission to be, at least in part, educational."' 2 In other
words, as a predicate to scrutinizing the operations of a hospital, corpo-
ration or instrumentality of government under Title IX, it must be estab-
lished that the entity itself functions in some educational capacity. The
phrase does not adjust the standard of liability applicable to colleges or
universities, for which the entire institution is the "education program or
149. See 134 Cong. Rec. E1049 (1988).
150. See Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 530 n.15 (1985)
(giving content to entire phrase selected by Congress pursuant to ordinary rules of statutory
construction).
151. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687(1), (2) (1994).
152. O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 118
S.Ct. 1048 (1998).
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activity" subject to Title IX.'53
The pre-enactment history of the CRRA confirms the Second Cir-
cuit's proper interpretation of the statute. Included in the Senate Report
accompanying the Act's passage are Senator Kennedy's remarks
explaining the materiality of the phrase "education program or activity":
If a private hospital corporation is extended federal assistance for its
emergency room, all the operations of the hospital, including for
example, the operating rooms, the pediatrics department, admissions,
discharge offices, etc., are covered under Title VI, section 504, and
the Age Discrimination Act. Since Title IX is limited to educational
programs or activities, it would apply only to the students and
employees of educational programs operated by the hospital, if
any. 154
The legislative history of the CRRA, as well as case law interpret-
ing the statute, both indicate that the phrase "education program or activ-
ity" limits the application of Title IX with respect to those hospitals,
corporations or government entities that operate an educational pro-
gram, 55 but do nothing to alter the breadth of Title IX's coverage with
respect to institutions of higher education. As concerns the latter, the
relevant "program or activity" for Title IX purposes is "the entire
institution."'156
153. See id. One district court has reached the opposite conclusion. In Preyer v. Dartmouth
College, 968 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D. N.H. 1997), the court dismissed a sexual harassment claim
brought by a college dining services employee on the ground that Title IX applied only to those
operations that have "an inherently educational goal." In addition to contradicting Title IX's
legislative history, the court in Preyer invoked anomalous authority that was effectively overruled
by the CRRA. Specifically, the court cites to Walters v. President & Fellows of Harvard College,
601 F.Supp. 867, 869 (D.Mass. 1985), for the proposition that "the [CRRA] did not alter the
requirement that the program or activity in which the complaining party is involved be educational
in nature." Preyer, 968 F. Supp. at 25. In Walters, the court refused to hold Harvard liable under
Title IX for sexual harassment by a grounds crew worker because the University was without
notice that discrimination was taking place in the buildings and grounds department. See Walters,
601 F. Supp. at 868-69. Walters however, turned on the inapplicability of agency principles to a
suit brought under Title IX, not on the theory that Title IX applies only to those institutional
operations that are "educational in nature." See id. Moreover, Walters was decided in 1985,
before the CRRA created federal jurisdiction over "all departments, buildings, colleges, and
graduate schools of th[e] university." Civil Rights Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1688.
154. S. Rep. No. 100-64, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 20.
155. Although Title IX's legislative history indicates Congress' intent to regulate, at minimum,
the educational operations of hospitals, corporations, and government entities, whether Title IX
attaches to the non-educational operations of covered entities other than institutions of higher
education remains an open question. See, e.g., Women's Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of
Corrections v. D.C., 93 F.3d 910, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (leaving open whether Title DX applies to
recreation, counseling, religious services and work details of prison facilities); Jeldness v. Pearce,
30 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding for factual determination of whether farm
annex, forest work camp, or prison industries are "educational" programs within the meaning of
Title IX).
156. O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 117-18.
CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE AND TITLE IX
The statute's nine enumerated exceptions 157 lend textual support to
the conclusion that Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in the non-aca-
demic operations of higher educational institutions, including the provi-
sion of student health benefits. That some of these exclusions logically
fall into the category of administrative or non-educational operations is
indicative of the statute's application to non-educational operations gen-
erally. The absence of additional non-educational exclusions supports
the inference that none were intended.158
The legislative history of the CRRA underscores that sex discrimi-
nation in the non-educational operations of a covered educational insti-
tution, such as the administration of student health insurance plans, is
prohibited by Title IX. The sponsors of Senate Bill 557, the precursor to
the CRRA, drafted the language "all of the operations" to capture a host
of institutional functions within the ambit of Title IX. The bill provided
that services relating to "faculty and student housing, campus shuttle bus
service, campus restaurants, the bookstore, and other commercial activi-
ties," when offered or provided by educational institutions, must be
offered on sex-neutral terms.1 59 The reach of Senate Bill 557 became
clear when an analysis authored by the Department of Justice was read
into the Congressional Record to explain the sweep of the phrase "all of
the operations".
[I]f an entity conducting one or more educational programs receives
Federal financial assistance to any part of the entity, whether or not
that part is educational, then... Title IX's ban on sex-discrimination,
appl[ies] to the entire entity, including non-educational activities ...
[t]he commercial and non-educational activities of a school, college
or university, including rental of commercial office space and hous-
ing to those other than students or faculty, and other commercial ven-
tures will be covered. 160
Rather than rebutting the Department's conclusion,161 proponents
of the CRRA accepted that the Amendment would extend federal control
over operations "absolutely unrelated to educational activities." 162
Added support for the application of the CRRA to non-educational
operations such as university sponsored health insurance plans echoed in
157. See supra note 95.
158. See North Haven v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (citing the absence of a specific
exclusion for the conclusion that none was intended); Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608,
616-17 (1980).
159. 134 Cong. Rec. S159 (1988).
160. 134 Cong. Rec. S2399-02 (1988).
161. See 134 Cong. Rec. S2399-02 (1988) ("The charge that the bill could extend federal
control over colleges and other public and private agencies to unreasonable, perhaps dangerous,
lengths has never been effectively rebutted.") (statement of Senator Karnes).
162. See 134 Cong. Rec. 2409-01 (1988); 134 Cong. Rec. S2399-02 (March 17, 1988).
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the statements of Senator Packwood, who saw no distinction between
sex-discrimination in the "whole school or the French department versus
the health department."16 3 Other CRRA supporters specifically urged
that the Amendment be drafted in broad language, in part to prohibit
college sponsored insurance programs that discriminate on the basis of
sex."6 Moreover, throughout the debates surrounding the abortion
Amendment, legislators made specific reference to the applicability of
Title IX to student health insurance plans. 6 5 Even the Office of Civil
Rights, prior to the passage of the CRRA, entertained suits against edu-
cational institutions challenging student health policies that discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex.' 66 This history indicates that Congress fully
intended for the provision of student health insurance plans to constitute
an "operation" of an educational institution that, when offered, must be
offered on non-discriminatory terms.
With respect to educational institutions, the United States Supreme
Court has verified that Title IX's sex-neutral mandate pertains to purely
administrative operations. In North Haven v. Bell,'67 the Court resolved
that "employment discrimination falls within the prohibition of Title
IX". 68 According to the Court, Title IX's broad directive that "no per-
son" may be discriminated against on the basis of sex "neither expressly
nor impliedly excludes employees from its reach." '169 Absent a contrary
indication in the statute's legislative history, Title IX must be accorded
"a sweep as broad as its language.' ' 70 After all, the Court concluded,
"Congress easily could have substituted 'student' or 'beneficiary' for the
word 'person' if it had wished to restrict the scope of [the statute].' 7'
The rationale in North Haven directly supports the application of
Title IX, as amended by the CRRA, to the terms of student health bene-
fit plans. First, the phrase "all of the operations" neither expressly nor
impliedly excludes administrative operations from the Amendment's
reach. Second, the bulk of Congressional testimony specifically con-
templates Title IX's application to student health plans.172 Third, as the
Court stated in North Haven, Title IX should be given "a sweep as broad
as its language."'' 73 Had Congress intended otherwise, it easily could
163. 34 Cong. Rec. S159-02 (1988).
164. 134 Cong. Rec. H565 (1988).
165. See 134 Cong. Rec. S159 (1988).
166. See 134 Cong. Rec. H565 (1988).
167. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
168. See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 520, 530-31.
169. Id. at 520-21.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 521.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 139-141, 153-165.
173. See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 521.
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have restricted the scope of the statute by inserting the word "educa-
tional" or "academic" within the CRRA phrase "all of the
operations."'
74
Following North Haven, however, it nevertheless remains plausible
that the application of Title IX to institutional employment decisions
does not ipso facto require the statute's application to policies unrelated
to the institution's educational mission. For instance, to the extent that
the composition of a college or university faculty impacts the learning
environment, 75 administrative hiring decisions could be characterized
as "educational" in nature. Therefore, North Haven's holding that a col-
lege or university is liable under Title IX for discrimination against aca-
demic employees does not necessarily extend the statute's application
beyond those operations designed solely to further educational
objectives.
This argument is easily addressed. First, North Haven does not
compel such a literal reading of Title IX. Nowhere in the opinion does
the majority ground its decision on the educational nature of the institu-
tion's faculty hiring decision. Instead, the majority cited extensively to
both pre and post-enactment history which references the statute's appli-
cation to non-educational operations generally. 76 Even the dissenting
Justices understood Title IX to apply to non-educational decisions. It
was the very extension of Title IX to administrative operations that kept
the three Justices from joining the majority opinion. 177
Second, since North Haven, the Office of Civil Rights has imple-
mented regulations prohibiting discrimination in expressly non-aca-
demic aspects of employment, including advertising, pay rates, fringe
benefits or any other term, condition or privilege of employment.,
78
Even if an initial hiring, placement or discharge decision might be con-
sidered educational by nature, the provision of employee fringe benefits
could not be said to affect a university's academic mission.
In light of the foregoing analysis, North Haven supports the appli-
cation of Title IX to the institutional operations of covered entities,
regardless of whether those operations are educational in nature. Fol-
lowing North Haven, the defense that an educational institution could
174. Cf id. at 520.
175. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Taxman v. Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1563,
(3d Cir. 1996).
176. See generally North Haven, 456 U.S. at 523-535.
177. See id. at 541 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's "tortured" conclusion that
Title IX protects "not only teachers and administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are
discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment...").
178. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (b)(1); (b)(3); (b)(10) (1998).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
not be held liable for discriminating against women in the provision of
health benefits fails.
D. Third Party Operations are Not Covered
A fourth justification could be offered in defense of a student insur-
ance plan that discriminates against women by excluding coverage for
prescription contraceptives. Even if Title IX applies to the non-educa-
tional operations of educational institutions, the defense would proceed,
the institution itself should only be held liable when it is directly respon-
sible for the discrimination. That is to say, to the extent that a university
serves in a capacity to market the product of a third party underwriter, a
discriminatory health insurance plan would not constitute an "operation
of' the educational institution. As such, the university should not be
deemed to have violated Title IX.
The response to this defense is threefold. First, federal funding
recipients are responsible for discrimination in any health benefit plan
"which such recipient administers, operates, offers, or participates in." '179
Thus, for liability purposes, whether an educational institution serves as
a marketing or processing agent is irrelevant. Second, given that
employers cannot escape liability for third party discrimination under
parallel civil rights laws, 180 a less expansive interpretation of Title IX
would expose the very loophole the statute was intended to close.18" '
Finally, in enacting the CRRA, Congress reaffirmed that the federal gov-
ernment "absolutely will not tolerate tax-supported discrimination."'' 82
To sanction the inadvertent funding of discriminatory third party pro-
grams would undermine the spirit and purpose of Title IX.' 83
Similarly, courts should not accept as a defense to a discriminatory
179. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(4) (1998).
180. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1089 (1983) (finding liability
where employer offered discriminatory retirement package underwritten by a third party); see
generally Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Under-representation in Publicly Funded Construction
Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 1582-83 (1992)
(demonstrating sponsoring state agency's liability under Title VI for discriminatory policies of
sub-contractor). As to whether insurance companies themselves can be liable for discrimination
under Title VII, the circuit courts have reached differing conclusions. Compare Spirt v. Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Asso'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 463 U.S. 1223
(1983) (holding insurer liable for offering discriminatory fringe benefits policy through
employer); and Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988)
(finding insurer liable for restricting employer choice to discriminatory policies), with Peters v.
Wayne State Univ. 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982) (refusing to find insurer liable where insured's
representative had no control over use of sex-specific mortality tables), vacated and remanded,
463 U.S. 1223 (1983). See generally, Andrew 0. Schiff, Note, The Liability of Third Parties
Under Title VII, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 167, 180-85 (1985).
181. See supra text accompanying note 121.
182. 133 Cong. Rec. S2400-02 (1987); 134 Cong. Rec. H565 (1988).
183. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (acknowledging
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student health insurance plan that policies available in the commercial
market typically exclude contraception. 84 In the employment context,
an employer who offers a discriminatory fringe benefit plan is not
shielded from Title VII liability simply because sex-neutral insurance
policy is commercially unavailable. As the Supreme Court made clear
in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris:185
It would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of
Title VII to hold that an employer who adopts a discriminatory
fringe-benefit plan can avoid liability on the ground that he could not
find a third party willing to treat his employees on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. An employer who confronts such a situation must either
supply the fringe benefit himself without the assistance of any third
party, or not provide it at all. 186
Given the similarity of purpose between Title VII and Title IX, 1
87
Norris stands as strong persuasive authority that educational institutions
do not escape liability under the latter simply because policies offered in
the public domain discriminate against women. The commercial
unavailability of sex-neutral plans "is simply irrelevant" when it comes
to institutional liability under Title IX.
E. Available Options: Foregoing Membership and
Alternative Packages
Finally, educational institutions could not defend the provision of
otherwise comprehensive health benefits that exclude coverage for pre-
scription contraceptives on the grounds that students may waive out of
university sponsored insurance coverage upon proof of individual cover-
age. 188 In Norris, the Court grounded employer liability on the fact that
employees were presented with discriminatory alternatives, despite that
employees enjoyed the liberty to forego enrollment in any particular
plan.' 89 "Once the State selected these companies ... [it] cannot dis-
claim responsibility for the discriminatory features of the insurers'
options."'1 90 Likewise, educational institutions cannot disclaim responsi-
that principal purpose of Title IX is "to avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices") (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
184. See Law, supra note 20, at 383.
185. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
186. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1090-91. The excerpt from Norris is cited verbatim to preserve
authenticity, and to demonstrate that despite its holding, the court's reliance on the pronouns "he"
and "his" as a pseudogeneric referent manifests a discriminatory subtext. See Deborah
Schweikart, The Gender Neutral Pronoun Redefined, 20 WOMEN's RTS. L. Rvr. 1 (1998).
187. See Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1994).
188. See, e.g., PENN, supra note 84, at 4; NEW YORK, supra note 84, at 3.
189. See generally Norris, 463 U.S. 1073.
190. Id. at 1089.
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bility for the discriminatory features of a student health insurance policy
simply because students have the option of obtaining their own cover-
age. It is the prerogative of educational institutions not to offer insur-
ance coverage in any form.19' Institutions that offer such a service must
do so on a non-discriminatory basis.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL STUDENT HEALTH PLAN
Concluding that the exclusion of contraceptive coverage from
otherwise comprehensive student health insurance plans is illegally dis-
criminatory, the task remains to designate the terms on which coverage
should be provided for prescription contraceptives. In designing such
coverage, two related goals should take priority: (1) redressing the sex-
based inequity inherent in the exclusion of reversible prescription con-
traceptives so that educational institutions that offer student health insur-
ance plans come into compliance with Title IX; and (2) ensuring that in
selecting a contraceptive method, a woman's choice is both informed
and individualized.' 92
The following are provisions which, at minimum, must be included
in a student health plan to ensure that birth control drugs and devices are
provided on a non-discriminatory basis, in a manner that facilitates
access to and financing for prescription contraceptives by middle-
income college-age women.
First, the plan must make clear the breadth of coverage provided for
prescription contraceptives. In plain, nontechnical language, the policy
must spell out the full range and extent of reimbursement that is pro-
vided for contraceptive drugs, devices and services. In a similar vein,
each plan should make plain its commitment to abide by state and fed-
eral anti-discrimination requirements. Further, implementation is cru-
cial. "Women need to know about contraceptive coverage, insurers need
to comply, and authorities need to enforce the law."' 193
Second, contraceptive coverage must be compulsory. Coverage for
birth control drugs, devices, and supplies must be provided under stu-
dent health plans whenever the plan provides reimbursement for other
prescription medications. It is not enough for insurance companies
merely to offer educational institutions the option of purchasing benefit
plans that include coverage for contraceptives.' 94 Coverage for contra-
191. 134 Cong. Rec. S159 (1988).
192. See LISA KAESER, What Methods Should Be Included In a Contraceptive Coverage
Insurance Mandate, 1998 ALAN GUTrMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, No. 5, 1.
193. See ACOG, supra note 10.
194. See V. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.5:1 (Michie 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 432:1-604.5,
431:1OA-116.6 (1994).
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ceptives must be provided under each plan that provides coverage for
other prescribed drugs and devices.
Third, contraceptive coverage must be complete. University spon-
sored health plans must reimburse beneficiaries fully for the costs of
birth control drugs, devices, and supplies. Providers must not single out
prescription contraceptives for enhanced deductibles, co-payments, co-
insurance, or contribution caps. 195 Where students are forced to obtain
an appropriate birth control method off campus because the full range of
birth control options are not available at student health centers, providers
must waive services charges that would otherwise accrue.1 96
Fourth, contraceptive coverage must be comprehensive. University
sponsored health plans must provide coverage for the full range of com-
monly prescribed birth control drugs, devices and supplies or their
generic equivalents.197 Absent comprehensive coverage, women with-
out significant disposable income would be forced to choose among less
suitable alternatives, which in turn would increase the risk of unin-
tended pregnancy. 98 The insurance industry would not tolerate a "one-
size-fits-all" mentality with respect to other prescription drugs, and
should not do so with respect to prescription contraceptives. 99
A comprehensive reimbursement scheme also would include cover-
age for consultations, examinations, procedures, education, and counsel-
ing related to the use of contraceptives."z° A woman's contraceptive
choice cannot be meaningful absent a full understanding of the range of
contraceptive options available, and the risks and benefits associated
with each option. Moreover, educational counseling with respect to
proper and consistent contraceptive use will maximize the effectiveness
of the chosen method.2°'
195. See, e.g., H.B. 630, 90th Legis., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1999); S.B. 222, 47th Legis., 1st Sess.
(Okla. 1999).
196. See UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, supra note 84, at 10.
197. See, e.g., A.B. 6168, 222d Legis., 1st Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
198. For example, the IUD, Depo-provera and Norplant are among the most cost-effective
birth control methods available, but least accessible due to up front costs. See James Trussell et
al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
494, 494 (1995). In 1993, a five year supply of birth control pills and related examinations cost
$1500; a five year supply of Norplant cost $700.00. See Law, supra note 20, at n.13. In
comparison, the cost of and IUD, which remains effective for eight years, was about $500.00 See
id.
199. See ACOG, supra note 10.
200. See, e.g., S.B. 82, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999).
201. Statistics regarding rates of unintended pregnancy reveal the need for enhanced
contraceptive counseling; almost half of the unintended pregnancies that occur are among women
who are using contraception incorrectly or inconsistently. See Coverage for Contraception, supra
note 9, at 6.
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V. CONCLUSION
The family planning needs of middle-income college-age women
are not being met. The system of health care financing operating in the
United States provides benefits primarily through employer-sponsored
health plans on the one hand, and publicly subsidized health care initia-
tives on the other. These programs target services toward women who
are either older and more affluent, or younger and poor. Middle-income
college-age women, however, seldom meet the eligibility requirements
necessary to receive health care services under either type of program.
While student health insurance plans offer these women an alternative
health care financing option, such plans typically fail to cover the costs
of prescription contraceptives. As demonstrated by the foregoing analy-
sis, this exclusion of birth control drugs and devices from student health
insurance plans constitutes sex-discrimination. As such, this exclusion
is prohibited under Title IX.
